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“The legal interventions of Thatcherism demand a historical analysis and assume a spatial one”. 
Stewart and Burridge (1989: 65) 
Introduction 
Our aim in this article is to explore the degree to which the changes produced in the provision of 
housing in England and Wales produced changes in the socio-spatial1 distribution of economic need and 
social deprivation, which in turn changed the distribution of crime. It is our contention that the changes 
in the distribution of crime were, in part, shaped by changes in other aspects of government action 
elsewhere, especially in terms of the management of the economy and the housing sector, and were 
accordingly lagged (Farrall and Jennings, 2012). As Stewart and Burridge argue, “during periods of crisis, 
law is instrumental in the uneven and unequal distribution of national resources, and that while the 
normative form of many law pretends towards national equality, the individual rights that are the 
vehicle for recent housing policy effectively convey spatially-defined uneven benefits” (1989: 78), or less 
prosaically, the law acts as a system for producing unequal outcomes despite its claims to produce 
national-defined equality. Whilst there have been numerous studies of who bought their homes under 
the right to buy scheme and what some of the social consequences have been, few have sought to piece 
together empirically the legislation, the changing social nature of housing provision which this produced, 
and the impacts which this has had on the distribution of crime.  
We seek also to contribute the understanding of the structurally-driven processes of victimisation. In so 
doing we turn to the work of Sandra Walklate (Walklate, 1992, 1996 and Mawby and Walklate, 1994) 
who proposed a ‘critical’ approach to exploring victimisation. Her proposed agenda calls for empirically-
based research, an integration of quantitative and qualitative methodologies, and comparative and 
longitudinal studies which are able to explore those social processes which ‘go on behind peoples’ 
backs’ (1996). Such an endeavour ultimately seeks to understand and explore the processes associated 
with victimisation in such a way that their socio-economic and cultural contexts were acknowledged 
(Walklate, 1992, 1996). Whilst many have explored the processes which drive victimisation using mixed 
                                                          
1
 We use the term ‘socio-spatial’ to indicate that different domestic spaces are associated with different social 
groups, but that certain similarities in practice and experience exist across these spaces. For example, a ‘leafy’ 
middle class area in, say Manchester may have more in common with a similar area of, say, London, than it might 
with a suburb in a poorer part of Manchester. As such, who lives in which locales and the social activities which 
they engage in is constitutive of these spaces – hence of use of the term socio-spatial.    
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methodologies, few, to our knowledge, have used longitudinal data to explore the ways in which the 
socio-spatial distribution of crime has changed, nor simultaneously linked this to legislative changes.  
Our article starts with a review of the ideological importance of housing in the wider Thatcherite agenda 
and the ways in which central government’s commitment to local authority housing developed in the 
period between 1945 and 1979. Following this we explore the wider institutional and legal frameworks 
which shaped the approach taken to the legislation during the 1980s, and review key aspects of this 
legislation from 1977 to 1989. Having briefly summarised the extent to which housing budgets were cut, 
we assess the degree to which council house sales were evenly distributed spatially and socially. We 
next explore the concepts of polarisation and residualisation before making a brief historical assessment 
of the notion of the ‘problem estate’. Following this we use various data sets (such as the General 
Household Survey (GHS), The British Crime Survey (BCS) and the British Social Attitudes Survey (BSA)) to 
explore the extent to which social renters were a) increasingly drawn from the more disadvantaged 
sections of society throughout the 1980s and b) increasingly more likely to be victimised in or around 
their homes.  
 
The Ideological Background 
Housing has always been considered an early target of Thatcherite policy initiatives because of the 
electoral support it was expected to garner. Whilst there are good reasons to see the sales of council 
housing as being in tune with an older, ‘pre-Thatcherite’ element within the Conservative Party (see 
Davies, 2013, which traces the ideological preferences for home ownership going back to 1945), it was 
nevertheless the 1979-1983 Thatcher government which took the first serious strides towards changing 
housing tenure in the UK. The sale of council housing, however, was particularly attractive to the 
Conservatives in 1979 as it spoke to several policy ambitions simultaneously; it was an attack on 
collective consumption and ownership; it dissolved the interests of council tenants and councils 
themselves; it disrupted the council’s status as a landlord; it transferred the public subsidy from local 
control to private bodies (former tenants, banks and building societies); and, of course, it was expected 
to expand home ownership and individual choice (Stewart and Burridge, 1989: 75, Hay, 1992). It also 
represented a ‘weak point’ in the fabric of the welfare state (Cole and Furbey, 1993: 181).  
In keeping with Hay (1992: 43) we see the development of Thatcherite policies as pragmatic as much as 
ideological. With regards to housing, as was the case with other privatisations of gas supply, 
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telecommunications and other public services, one key aim of the changes initiated during the 1980s 
was to restructure the state and the ways in which it interacted with the citizenry. Such a restructuring, 
naturally, made a reversal of the potential Thatcherite settlement all the harder (Hay, 1992: 45). The 
provision of council housing increased hugely during the 1950s (Dunleavy 1981; Hay 1992: 48). 
However, the Conservative government continued to promote private housing over council housing 
until 1964 when it was replaced by a Labour government which was committed to the expansion of 
council housing (Hay, 1992: 49). The public’s support of high-rise flats was garnered on the basis of 
arguments linking their development with notions such as ‘progress’ and ‘technology’, and as such can 
be read as the physical manifestation of the logic of modernity – that the city could be transformed 
socially and in terms of economic productivity by changing it’s very physical nature (Dunleavy, 1981, 
Pawley, 1966, Hay, 1992: 50). Although high-rise flats were not initially popular with those for whom 
they were intended, the support for high-rise living amongst the working class was produced on the 
basis of arguments that they represented an improvement on the ‘slums’ which had existed previously, 
and that they were ‘exciting’ and ‘new’.    
Following Thatcher’s election as leader of the Conservative Party in 1975, housing started to form a key 
plank in the articulation of other policy ideas. In this respect it is hardly surprising that the idea of selling 
council houses to their tenants was presented in the 1979 Conservative Party’s election manifesto under 
the heading of ‘Helping the Family’ – another key element in Thatcherite ideology. In this way the 
Thatcherite approach to housing must be seen as part of a much wider ideological package of moral 
authoritarianism which incorporated various ‘traditional values’ associated with the idea of the ‘nuclear’ 
family (Hay 1992: 54; Hayes, 1994).  
Once in office, the Conservative government’s strategy was to move away from the idea that the role of 
governments was to produce a consensus in which the hopes and aspirations of citizens could be 
accommodated. This was characterised by Thatcher in her speech to a Conservative Party rally in Cardiff 
during the 1979 general election (16th April) in which she argued that Moses had not asked his ‘brothers’ 
for a ‘consensus’. This approached required what might be thought of as a ‘political triage’ in which 
some sectional interests were accommodated and others were downplayed, marginalized or just 
ignored. This ‘split-nation’ strategy as some have termed it (Loney, 1986, Rentoul, 1987, Walker and 
Walker, 1987, Jessop et al 1988) ran not along two lines as Jessop et al suggest (the ‘haves’ and the 
‘have nots’), but rather along three lines, viz, the ‘haves’, the ‘have nots’ and the ‘might haves’ (Hay, 
1992: 55). In housing terms, the ‘haves’ were those who already owned their homes; the ‘have nots’ 
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were those who did not, whilst the ‘might haves’ were those who currently did not own their own 
homes, but who might be tempted to do so if offered enough opportunities and incentives to do so. 
Against this backdrop the stage was set for a radical recasting of the legal instruments surrounding 
housing.  
  
The Wider Institutional and Legal Frameworks 
As Murie (1985: 173) notes, a government keen to develop private housing in place of public-owned 
housing, as Thatcher’s was, did not need to ‘create’ market based organisations, ideas and mechanisms 
(such as lenders, estate agents, and the concepts of ‘property’, ‘mortgages’ and ‘domestic space’) from 
scratch, since these institutions already existed. Similarly, the incoming Conservative government also 
inherited a ready-made mechanism for controlling (and hence reducing) new capital expenditure in the 
form of Housing Strategies and Investment Programmes (Housing Plans in Scotland), introduced by the 
previous government in order to introduce cash limits (Murie, 1985: 173).  
In examining the ways in which crime and disorder were redistributed during the 1980s, one needs to 
explore the context in which the legal framework surrounding housing provision and the housing market 
itself in England and Wales changed following the 1980 Housing Act. Undeniably housing policy played a 
crucial role in the elections of 1979 and 1983 (Monk and Kleinman, 1989: 121) with a flurry of policy 
innovation unleashed after 1979 (Stewart and Burridge 1989: 66). . Table 1 below summarises the key 
Acts of Parliament which affected housing provision in the UK (and in particular England and Wales) 
between 1977 and 1989.    
The first key legislative change we need to document actually relates to the prior Labour administration; 
the 1977 Homeless Persons Act. This act was, in many respects, another key plank in the welfare state, 
and although many or the larger urban local authorities had already developed strategies for 
homelessness. The Act was intended to extend housing provision to those individuals and families 
hitherto unable to secure their own accommodation (Atkinson and Durden, 1990: 118, Ginsburg, 1997: 
141) and was therefore responding to trends which were emerging prior to 1977. The Act extended the 
definition of homelessness, thereby increasing the numbers of those deemed homeless and placed new 
responsibilities to house those with greater social needs  (Murie, 1989: 213, Atkinson and Durden, 1990: 
118) and created a “radically new housing market” (Bottoms et al, 1992: 140). Ginsburg reports that the 
numbers of people presenting themselves as homeless increased every year from 1979 to 1991; in 1979 
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57,200 were accepted a homeless in England, peaking at 151,720 in 1991 (1997: 141). As such, 
throughout the 1980s there was a growing social polarisation between those in council housing and 
those living in homes they owned (the private rented sector had been in decline for many years, Murie, 
1989: 214) as those in council stock were increasingly  drawn from those ‘in need’. 
However, in addition to the 1977 Act, there had been a series of attempts to reduce public expenditure 
on housing since 1976 (Murie, 1989: 213). Thus, when the Conservative government was elected to 
office in 1979, it inherited a system in which housing expenditure was already being cut and local 
authority house-building was already in decline (Murie, 1989: 213). Housing had been a particular focus 
of the Conservative election manifesto in 1979, being given more space than social security, health, 
welfare or education. The key aim however, had been the introduction of the right to buy one’s council 
house for existing tenants. This was introduced by the 1980 Housing Act.  
TABLE ONE ABOUT HERE 
The key change, in addition to the introduction of the ‘right to buy’, was the change in the levels of 
expenditure made with regards to housing. The right to buy proved to be particularly popular with the 
skilled working class, who, as Stewart and Burridge note (1989: 70), might otherwise have moved to 
different locations and become owner-occupiers anyway. During the passing of the Act, amendments 
were introduced by the House of Lords, resulting in a number of concessions on the part of the 
government, one of which was that accommodation designed or adapted for the elderly ought to be 
excluded from the right to buy provisions. Whilst understandable in terms of trying to prevent the 
exposure of elderly people to the processes of marketisation being unleashed, the amendment had the 
effect of ‘trapping’ elderly people in some accommodation in some estates, and may have contributed, 
albeit in a small way, to the processes of residualisation (see below). Together, the 1982 Social Security 
and Housing Benefit Act combined the existing systems of rent and rebates with allowances, and 
supplementary benefits assistance with rents, transferring the administrative burden of this welfare 
provision from central to local government (Hay, 1992: 57). These Acts effectively placed local 
authorities in the situation of needing to explain and implement the very cuts they had fought against 
(Cole and Furbey, 1993: 198). Subsequently, in the first four years of its operation, the 1982 Act 
effectively removed around 1million households from eligibility (Cole and Furbey, 1993: 198). Later, the 
1986 Social Security Act removed a further £450million from housing benefit expenditure (Cole and 
Furbey, 1993: 198) and in the same year, the 1986 Housing and Planning Act laid down the measures by 
which publicly owned housing could be transferred en masse to private owners (Hay, 1992: 58). In effect 
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the ‘might haves’ were now amongst the ‘haves’ and the ‘have nots’ and their interests could be 
jettisoned. The 1986 Buildings Societies Act was a response to the fact that many building societies were 
reluctant to release money for council house sales (Murie, 1985: 185) and that building societies were 
being hampered by the existing legislation (Boddy, 1989: 92-93), and was the first comprehensive 
legislation on building societies since 1874. The 1986 Housing and Planning Act extended the discounts 
available. As a rejoinder, the 1996 Housing Act withdrew the right of homeless families to tenancy in the 
social rented sector, thereby pushing more of them towards the private rented sector (Ginsburg, 1997: 
141). However, as Blandy and Hunter demonstrate, whilst there were a number of legal challenges 
made to the acts (most notably that by Norwich City Council), the courts tended to reinforce the 
‘responsiblising’ aspects of the new legislation. . In this respect, they argue, the courts acted in a more 
neo-liberal manner than central government, which had attempted to limit purchaser’s expose to risk 
and responsibility (Blandy and Hunter, 2012: 25).   
 
Data from the BCS and the BSAS (Table 2) suggests growing proportions of owners (including those 
buying with mortgages) and decreasing proportions of people living in the social rented sector. The 1982 
BCS sample, for example, consisted of some 61% of owners/people buying with a mortgage and 30% 
social renters (slightly under-representing owners; Pawson and Wilcox put these at 67% in 1981, 2013: 
122, Table 17a). The 1983 BSAS sample consisted of 66% of owners/those buying with a mortgage, and 
27% social renters. By 1992 the BCS consisted of some 68% of owners/those buying and 22% social 
renters, whilst the BSAS of 1993 had 71% owners/buying with a mortgage and 23% social renters (so 
both under represented owners and over-represented those in social housing). Indeed, both datasets 
therefore appear to track the decline in the social rented sector (which would always have been 
dominated by local authority landlords) and the increase in those people owning or buying their homes. 
see Table 2. 
TABLE TWO ABOUT HERE 
 
The Distribution of Sales 
By 1990, over 1.5million council houses had been sold (Malpass and Murie, 1990: 96). Within the 
country, however, the distribution of sales was not even. Murie reports that sales of council housing 
8 
 
were higher in the South and East, and lowest in the North and Inner London (1989: 220). Atkinson and 
Durden offer further detail showing that, until at least the mid-1980s, most sales took place in the 
south-east and adjacent areas (1994: 186). By June 1988 none of the 15 local authorities which had sold 
more than 30% of their housing stock were in the North, Yorkshire and Humberside, the West Midlands, 
the North West or Inner London (all were in the South or East). Yet even within regions variations 
existed; sales were highest in those districts which had fewest flats and where homeownership rates 
were already high (suggesting that not all accommodation was equally desired and that there was a 
‘follow-your-neighbour’ effect to house purchases).  Atkinson and Durden note that the majority of sales 
were to those living in houses (as opposed to flats), 1990: 121. McNabb and Wass report that single 
people were the least likely to buy their homes, and this decreased with the presence and number of 
children (1999: 671). Cole and Furbey (1993: 198) note that the sales of council houses were 
concentrated amongst prosperous (rather than economically depressed) areas, middle-aged tenants 
with adult children (rather than the elderly or younger residents), and the skilled working class (as 
opposed to welfare claimants). In terms of the stock which was purchased, as Murie notes it was the 
“estates with which contain[ed] the best quality, most spacious, traditionally-built houses with gardens 
tend to be those which were most popular and in highest demand” (1997: 28). As Forrest and Murie 
(1988) note, “the erosion of local authority discretion in the provision of housing has heightened the 
geographical divisions in council house ownership between north and south, inner city and suburb, 
tower block and terrace” (1988: 80). In other words, national-level laws played out in different ways in 
different places.  
 
Residualisation and Polarisation 
Residualisation refers to the long-term trend for council housing to  
a) become less associated with and used by affluent members of society;  
b) cater increasingly for lower income groups (such as the elderly, those not working, and some 
ethnic minority groups); and  
c) accordingly to cater less and less for the affluent working class and lower middle class (Murie, 
1997: 26).  
9 
 
As such, residualisation is associated with a shrinking of the numbers of people relying on council 
housing, the concentration of entrenched social and economic problems amongst those housed in 
council-owned accommodation, and the political marginalisation of council tenants in discourses and 
debates about housing (Cole and Furbey, 1993: 198)2.  
 
Prior to Thatcher’s election, both owner-occupation and council housing had been rising (at the expense 
of the private rented sector). However, the increases in the reductions of the price with which tenants 
could buy their council homes and the rises in the mortgage interest relief rates meant that the public 
sector moved closer towards catering for the poorest and most disadvantaged households (Monk and 
Kleinman, 1989: 127). In addition to this, the requirement for councils to house some of the most-needy 
households (a requirement of the 1977 Homeless Persons Act) meant that this process was  further 
enhanced. In line with Ginsberg (see above), Kemp reports that in 1978 the number of household being 
accepted for housing on the basis of homelessness was just over 53,000 (Table 5.6, 1992: 77), whilst by 
1986 this had doubled to almost 103,000, and increased to over 126,000 by 1989. Williams quotes even 
higher figures, noting that “probably as many were turned away” (1992: 177). The causes of this 
dramatic growth are complex; social and demographic changes would have accounted for some of it 
(divorce rates were increasing, see David, 2014: 180 and Hill and Walker, 2014: 86-88) and people were 
living for longer too. In addition, unemployment would have forced some either to relocate, leaving 
existing homes or to move, possibly making dependents homeless. Nevertheless, Kemp is not alone in 
attributing the rise in homelessness to government policies, albeit unintended ones, such as changes to 
the rules governing social security eligibility (1992: 78). Williams (1992: 187) goes as far as to suggest 
that by the early 1990s, the main route into council housing was via homelessness. The better housing 
stock in the better areas became privatised, and hence (typically) mixed-tenure estates emerged in 
suburban areas, whilst inner city areas underwent a process of ghettoisation (Stewart and Burridge 
1989: 76).  Williams argues that “All the evidence shows growing concentrations of people on the lowest 
incomes without employment and reliant on state benefits” in the local authority housing sector (1992: 
182). Monk and Kleinman argue that this has led to the emergence of a new underclass of housing with 
around 20-30% of the homeless and badly housed who can expect little improvement in the situations 
(1989: 129). In this respect, as Cole and Furbey (1993: 208) argue, during the period from 1979 until the 
                                                          
2
 It is important to note the process of residualisation can be traced back to the 1970s ( Atkinson and Durden, 
1990: 119), although it intensified considerably during the 1980s (Kemp, 1992: 76). 
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early 1990s, housing tenure became increasing polarised between an owner-occupation sector catering 
for the affluent and/or aspiring skilled working class and middle class (the ‘haves’), and a council-
provided sector catering for the poor, the unemployed, the elderly, and ethnic minority households (the 
‘have nots’ – the ‘might haves’ having migrated into the ‘haves’). These trends are confirmed by our 
analyses of the BCS, BSAS and GHS.3 Tables 3 and 4 report on various markers of residualisation from the 
BCS and BSAS. We see, for example, that the BCS owners are likely to experience low levels of 
unemployment (between 2% and 4%), whilst for the social renters this is between 6% and 11%. These 
track general trends in the unemployment rate, but the increases in the rates are higher for those in the 
social rented sector and slower to fall. Unsurprisingly, therefore, more of those in social rented housing 
experience low levels of income. Both the BCS and BSAS suggest that over time the percentage of 
owners in the lowest income bracket declines, whilst the same figure for social renters either plateaus 
around 40-50% (BCS) or increases (BSAS). The BCS asked its fieldwork team to assess the state of local 
housing in the area adjacent to the homes in which they complete interviews. Between 1984 and 1994 
this hovered around 2% for owners, whilst for social renters it remained around the 9% level (despite 
the work of Housing Associations towards the end of this period). Penetration into the owners market 
by ethnic minorities ran at around 4% to 5% using both the BCS and BSAS. However, amongst social 
renters both data sets suggest that more of the people living in this tenure were made up of ethnic 
minorities (rising from 4% to 5% in the early 1980s to around 10% by the late 1990s). 
Table 4 deals with welfare recipients in the two social groups we are most interested in (owners and 
social renters) and again supports the general notion that levels of residualisation have increased 
amongst the social renters. For example, whilst 40% of owners were in receipt of incapacity benefit in 
1986, the same figure for social renters was 67%, and whilst the owners slowly decreased between 1986 
and 1991, for the social renters there was very little meaningful change in the percentage claiming 
incapacity benefits. Whilst a very small number of owners were receiving single parent benefits (2-3%) 
                                                          
3
 Further details about the dataset we have collated can be found in Jennings et al, 2015. The BCS was first 
conducted in 1982, and was commissioned by the UK government to measure the ‘dark figure’ of unreported 
crime incidents. The survey moved to an annual basis from 2001. As well as collecting information on victimisation 
and fear of crime, it collects information on a range of attitudes towards the criminal justice system, causes of 
crime and demographic information about respondents. Our collation of the data collected from 1982 until 2012 
resulted in a dataset of almost 600,000 respondents. The BSAS began in 1983. It is based on an annual random 
probability, face-to-face survey of Britons. The series was designed to act as a counterpart to other large-scale 
government surveys such as the Labour Force Survey or the General Household Survey, which provide data on 
behavioural actions and tangible ‘facts’. It has been conducted every year since 1983, except in 1988 and 1992. 
Our collation of the data collected from 1982 until 2012 resulted in a dataset of almost 90,000 respondents. The 
General Household Survey started in 1971, and interviews about 10,000 people each year.  
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for social renters this was rising (from 6% to around 10%). Similarly owners saw declines in housing 
benefits, whilst social renters (always higher anyway) saw increases. A similar trend is observable for 
unemployment; although both groups saw declining percentages of people claiming unemployment 
benefit. 
TABLES THREE AND FOUR ABOUT HERE 
The GHS also asked about economic activity and tenure. Looking at economic activity by tenure since 
1972 until the mid-1990s (Table 6), one sees a distinct shift from social renters and owners/those buying 
with a mortgage having similar rates of unemployment to quite distinctly higher rates for social renters.  
TABLE FIVE ABOUT HERE 
It is clear, therefore, by all of the measures we have explored, and using three of the most respected 
data sources on these topics, that the social renters have slowly become part of a residualised sector in 
society, earning less than owners, relying more heavily on specific welfare schemes, working less, being 
more likely to come from ethnic minorities, and living in areas with both a high turnover of residents 
and a greater percentage of housing stock in poor conditions. 
 
Crime and the ‘Problem Estate’: An Historical View 
The council housing estates which provided homes for the affluent working class in the interwar and 
immediately post-war period were not associated with crime, disorder or social disorganisation at all 
(Murie, 1997). At this stage it was the declining, inner-city, privately-rented households which were 
associated with crime, high levels of turnover and low levels of social control (Murie, 1997). Such areas 
developed a reputation for being ‘poor’ - along a number of indices; in terms of their physical structure, 
in terms of the other residents and in terms of their prospects for improvement, (Murie, 1997: 24, 
Bottoms et al 1992: 132). Council housing did not make up a very large proportion of the areas which 
were deemed (officially or informally) to be ‘problem estates’, although as Baldwin and Bottoms show, 
the age of an estate was associated with variations in the rate of resident offenders (1976: 163). As 
such, the social rented housing sector was an extremely complex one. Generally, however, council 
estates saw very high levels of employment and very low levels of disorder. In some cases, by dint of 
many residents sharing the same employer or working in very highly related and integrated sectors of 
the economy, the relationships which fostered appropriate levels of informal social control in the 
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workplace, in schools and in trade unions often cascaded into relationships between neighbours – who 
often worked together in order to maintain and produce a well-ordered environment in which rules 
were obeyed and authority respected (Bottoms et al, 1992: 134, Murie, 1997). In this respect, it is 
important to bear in mind that the association between council housing and crime is a) a relatively 
recent one and b) not, therefore, an automatic one.  
Having reviewed the available evidence on the relationship between crime and housing tenure, Murie 
concludes that “… the spatial distribution of crime and victimisation owes a considerable amount to the 
spatial concentration of council housing” (1997: 26), and in particular the changes in the nature of the 
social groups who inhabit such housing. Murie explains the changes in the spatial concentration of crime 
via processes outlined above (chiefly residualisation, polarisation and privatisation). As Murie (1997) 
notes, housing policies, the processes of allocation and social stigma all contribute to the incidence and 
spatial distribution of crime. For example, not all council estates were seen as equally ‘good’, and those 
applicants who were felt to be ‘less deserving’ were allocated accommodation on such estates (Murie, 
1997: 28). Similarly discriminatory practices helped to produce some estates in which there were 
concentrations of vulnerable people – but in the main the concentrations and their associations with 
crime were the exception, not the rule. However, whilst these trends can be identified going back over a 
number of years, the pace of such changes has quickened over the past 20 years.  
 
Crime and the RTB: Our Contribution 
Our aims in this contribution are to explore the long term social and socio-spatial effects of the 1980 
Housing Act (and those Acts which followed it), and in particular the right to buy, on the spatial 
distribution of crime in English and Welsh cities. Our aims are to assess the extent to which those who 
remained in council owned houses (and similar accommodation owned by other organisations such as 
housing associations) became at increased risk of victimisations such as burglary, theft from the home, 
vandalism, and car crime.   
We explore the impact of the right to buy and related legislation on the socio-spatial distribution of 
crime using two principal data sets – namely the British Crime Survey and the British Social Attitudes 
Survey, and in so doing we focus on the data collected under the auspices of these data sets form 1982 
(in the case of the BCS) and 1983 (in the case of the BSAS). Our main focus will be on crimes relating to 
domestic property crime in the year prior to the survey (namely, someone breaking into the 
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respondent’s home, someone trying to break in to steal or cause damage, anything being stolen from 
within the home or anything being stolen from outside the home, a definition very close to that used by 
Trickett et al, 1995). Ultimately, we show that the ideological basis of the right to buy legislation, as well 
as shifting the nature of housing tenure in England and Wales, is also implicated in the increase in 
property crime in some of our cities’ poorer estates. As such, ideological chances, when enacted via 
legal systems can act to produce changes – albeit slowly - in the distribution of some forms of property 
victimisation. 
 
Crime Prevention 
Before we examine the relationship between housing tenure and victimisation, let us look at the degree 
to which owners and social renters were protected from burglary victimisation by, in this case, burglar 
alarms (we choose burglar alarms since the BCS has asked about these, with the exception of 1984, 
since 1982). This data (Table 6) suggests that whilst the two groups were roughly on a par with one 
another in 1982, this parity quickly disappeared, and by the turn of the century three times as many 
owners and those buying with a mortgage had burglar alarms when compared to those in social renting. 
So, even though coverage increased, it did so unevenly. 
TABLE SIX ABOUT HERE 
 
Tenure and Victimisation 
Let us now turn to explore the relationship between victimisation (in or near to the homes of survey 
respondents) and tenure over time. One of the problems that we face in undertaking such an analysis is 
that the BCS did not start until 1982, and therefore the earliest self-report victimisation data which it 
can provide us with is for the year 1981. As this came after the commencement of the right to buy, the 
BCS cannot provide with information about the relative distribution of victimisation prior to the 
commencement of council house sales. However, the GHS fielded a series of questions about theft from 
and within the home in 1972, 1973 and 1980 which provide us with a ‘baseline’ picture of the 
relationship between tenure and victimisation.  Table 7 reports the data from the GHS for the questions 
about being burgled in the previous year for 1972, 1973 and 1980 (it was not asked in any other years 
prior to 1980). These questions suggest that housing tenure was not strongly associated with burglary in 
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the years prior to the right to buy legislation coming into force. The data presents a remarkably stable 
picture; about 2% of owners and 3% of renters had been burgled in the previous year (so 1971, 1972 
and 1979).4 
TABLES SEVEN AND EIGHT ABOUT HERE 
Table 8 explores, by way of and Mann-Whitney’s U tests, the average number of such victimisations by 
owners/renters.5 This suggests that the average number of domestic thefts for renters (which would 
have included those in the private rented sector) was higher than for those owning or buying their own 
homes. However, this was, even with just three data points, a relatively stable situation, with the mean 
difference (around .018) hardly changing at all. So whilst renters experienced on average more domestic 
thefts between 1971 and 1979, there appeared to be no underlying change in the relative risks in the 
eight or so years before the right to buy was introduced.  
Let us now turn to the BCS data for the experiences of owners and renters from 1981 (the year which 
the 1982 BCS would have asked about). Of course, the comparison with the earlier GHS is not perfect 
(since the two surveys ask slightly differently worded questions), but the data is sufficient for our 
purposes. Whilst the GHS data suggested little difference between the owners and renters, this picture 
changes when we look at the BCS data (for which we have combined into one measure items asking 
about entering the home and causing damage, entering the home to steal or cause damage, having 
items stolen from within the home and having items stolen from outside the home). See Table 9:  
TABLE NINE ABOUT HERE 
This data suggests that both social renters and home owners saw increases in crimes around their 
homes during the 1980s. However, it does not suggest that there were huge variations in experiences; 
more social renters had experienced this sort of victimisation, but their rates had not increased terribly 
much higher than those of owners. Table 10 suggests a slightly different picture, however; what the data 
demonstrates is that in 1982 social renters already had about twice the levels of burglary victimisation 
                                                          
4
 The GHS data distinguishes between owners/buyers and renters (rather than those renting privately or from 
social landlords, although the vast majority would have been renting from social landlords, and in this era that 
would have meant local authorities).  
5
 Since our variable (the number of victimisations) is skewed, we report tests using Mann-Whitney’s U. The Mann-
Whitney test is a non-parametric test that allows two groups/ conditions/ treatments to be compared without 
making the assumption that values are normally distributed.  The logic behind the Mann-Whitney test is to rank 
the data for each condition, and then see how different the two rank totals are from each other  (Mann and 
Whitney, 1947). 
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than owners did (in line with the GHS proportions, see Table 8). Whilst the general trend for the social 
renters is upwards until 1996 (with a slight dip in 1984), the owners experienced a far ‘shallower’ 
increase (which plateaued from 1984 until 1992) and then a decline from a peak of .1724 in 1994. By the 
end of the data run in 2000, their average number of victimisations of this sort had declined to below 
1982 levels. For social renters the situation in 2000 had worsened considerably; in 1982 the average 
number of burglaries was .0891, a figure which had risen to .1685 by 2000 (in effect, a doubling).    
TABLE TEN ABOUT HERE 
Discussion 
We have established that since 1980 the size of the social renting sector has a) declined in size, and b) 
become residualised (that is, narrowed the social base from which it draws). Whilst this narrative fits 
with the existing literature (e.g. Murie, 1997, Kemp, 2014), there are two potential ways in which these 
changes may have been related to higher and more concentrated levels of domestic property crime. The 
first of these relates to what may be thought of changes at the level of the individual household, whilst 
the second to changes in the social make-up of some council/social landlord estates.  
Let us take these in order. So, for example, if more households in some of the more attractive estates 
with generally lower levels of crime buy their houses, then there is little redistribution of crime 
geographically – the changes which we have identified are simply the result of our ‘re-labelling’ these 
household as ‘owners’. This has the effect of making it appear that there was a change in crime levels 
associated with different tenures – but actually there might be little (or no) change in where such crimes 
took place geographically, it is simply that we have shifted one set of social renters into a different 
category. Of course, over time, former-council renters who now owned their homes may choose to 
invest in additional security devices (such as burglar alarms). In any case, it does not assume that there 
was a process of what might be termed ‘residential replacement’ (i.e. a turnover in residents). When 
this residential replacement came, it too did little to alter crime rates, we suspect. This is because, when 
council house tenants who had bought their homes came to sell them, the general rise in house 
properties meant that they were (in the main) selling to those who could get mortgages afford to buy 
these homes. Hence estates with low levels of crime tended to remain low crime estates. The second 
possibility (which operates at a different level of explanation) is that the ‘worst’ estates, which always 
had more crime and victimisation, experienced an increase in property crime. This might have been 
because, over time, the concentration of households with social and economic problems increased as a 
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result of the economic down turn and the loss of employment in manufacturing, coal mining and allied 
trades. Those who could leave did so leaving their council homes to be re-let by the council to those in 
greater need (residential replacement) and that this brought with it the sorts of social and economic 
needs associated with crime and disorder. Such processes would have been most keenly felt in those 
estates in which few had bought their council homes and where jobs, and the hopes which they had 
given people, were lost during processes of ‘restructuring’.   
Disentangling these two processes is, using the data available to us, not an easy task. However, some 
informed assessments can be made. It is unlikely, we think, that the right to buy led to dramatic 
increases in rates of residential replacement immediately. Those tenants who bought did so because 
they liked their homes and the areas they were in and were not speculating in the (then embryonic) 
housing market (Forrest and Murie, 1990: 23). This suggests that the first explanation above is plausible. 
However, with the passage of time, there is a greater (and increasing) rate of residential replacement. 
The first of the right to buy homes start to be resold and in some areas the resale values of these put 
them beyond the reach of lower income households, tending to reinforce levels of ‘exclusivity’ (Forrest 
and Murie, 1988: 172-3) and social control (and hence suppressing dramatic increases in crime – even if 
increases were experienced). In those areas in which fewer former-council houses were bought the 
pressure to accommodate increasing numbers of those in social need meant that the estates which 
remained in council ownership saw increases in anti-social behaviour and crime. As this suggests, the 
second explanation starts to become more significant over time. Particularly notable here is that, using 
data from the 2000 BCS, Tseloni (2006) found that one of the strongest predictors of rates of property 
crime was share of social housing;  social renting increased household crimes by at least 40% compared 
with owner-occupancy, “possibly because of entangled effects of social vulnerability and/or proximity to 
potential offenders” (2005: 219; cf. Kershaw and Tseloni, 2005).  
The relative pace at which these processes took hold will, of course, be shaped by local policies and 
economic fortunes. Objectively similar estates in, say, the southeast and the northeast may have 
experienced different processes which operated at different speeds due to the availability of 
employment locally. Additionally the nature of the stock on council estates (high-rise, low-rise or houses 
– and again the age and size of these) will also have shaped long-term outcomes. 
 
Conclusion 
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Our article has sought to contribute the understanding of the structurally-driven processes of 
victimisation. Herein we have taken legislation relating to housing (specifically the right to buy one’s 
own council house – a key plank in Thatcherite ideology) as the key element in changing the structural 
processes which shaped the socio-spatial distribution of crime in England and Wales in the late 1970s. 
Whilst the structures we have explored have been legislative ones, changes in the law do not come from 
nowhere; they are produced by governments seeking to promote particular ideological agendas. As the 
processes associated with this restructuring took hold during the 1980s, so we see, using data from a 
range of respected sources (namely government-sponsored surveys) increases in the disparities 
between owners and social renters in terms of their exposure to domestic property victimisation. 
Elsewhere we have charted the ways in which government policies pursued in the 1980s were 
associated with rises in property crime (Jennings et al, 2012, Farrall and Jennings, 2014). This article 
suggests that as well as producing a rise in property crime rates (which of course led to the much lauded 
crime drop), other aspects of the social policies pursued at this time, produced a social and (eventually) 
geographical concentration of crime amongst some social groups and in some areas of our towns and 
cities.  
Our approach has been informed by the work of Sandra Walklate (Walklate, 1992, 1996 and Mawby and 
Walklate, 1994) who proposed that criminologists adopt a more ‘critical’ approach to exploring 
victimisation. Using longitudinal data we have been able to explore the legal and social processes which 
‘go on behind peoples’ backs’. Whilst many of the people living in social housing may be acutely aware 
of the exaggerated risks they face, few have explored the ways in which political imperatives and legal 
apparatus operated together to produce such risks. As such, not only might one argue that governments 
help to shape the levels of crime a society will experience (by, for example, their handling of the 
economy) so, it would appear, can they shape which social groups experience increases (or decreases) in 
their relative rates of victimisation. Similar findings have been reported in other countries which 
underwent New Right-led restructuring; Currie (1990:308) notes that cuts to the US housing budget in 
the 1980s “meant that public housing did often become housing of last resort…” with a “concentration 
of social pathology – drug-dealing, violence, gang warfare and family disruption” whilst Levitt reports 
that in the mid-1970s poorer households in the US were burgled less than richer ones, but by the mid-
1990s this situation had reversed (1999: 87).  
For Thatcher, the political requirement to build a social base for the ideas embodied in the – at that time 
- still embryonic project we now know as ‘Thatcherism’ meant that housing became a key policy arena. 
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For various reasons, many of which we outline above, housing was targeted for ideological reasons 
(which supported the project of Thatcherism at an ideational level) and for what it might do for the 
electoral base (the assumption being that hone-owners would start to vote conservative). In these ways 
the changes to housing laws enacted in the 1980s were not (as Blandy and Hunter, 2012 note) a 
‘neutral’ instrument, but one which could be used to reinforce various forms of inequalities – some of 
which, as we document above, related to exposure to victimisation. One of the ironies in the tale of 
Thatcherism and crime, was that council housing was not associated with crime prior to the right to buy 
legislation (Murie, 1997), but slowly became virtually synonymous with it. This in turn, along with rising 
crime rates generally, and the consequences of social policy endeavours  in other parts of society (such 
as the withdrawal of economic support from some sectors of the economy, the changes to the social 
security system, Care in the Community policies (Murie, 1997) and the later increases in the exclusion of 
children from school, which was associated with anti-social behaviour, Timmins, 2001:566), led to a 
situation in which some of the key ingredients in the recipe for rising crime rates were brought together 
in temporally and spatially. For example, league tables of school exams were first published in 1992 
(Timmins, 2001:519), which encouraged head teachers to exclude unruly children (in order to increase 
school examination performance). Accordingly, school exclusions rose throughout the 1990s (reaching a 
peak of 12,668 in 1996-97, DFeS, 2001), resulting in increases in anti-social behaviour as such children 
continued to behaviour badly, only now in public areas, such as residential streets, rather than at school 
(Timmins, 2001:566, Berridge, et al., 2001). This concentration, socially and spatially organised as it was, 
tended to produced feedback loops, whereby those who could leave such estates did so (Forrest and 
Murie, 1990: 47 report that movers were more likely to be non-manual workers than those who bought 
their former council homes and remained in them) and those who were left behind were increasingly 
marginalised from the political debates (the ‘have-nots’, Hay, 1992). Such marginalisation, however, also 
allowed for this social group to be presented (against the backdrop of worklessness, crime, fragmented 
families and ‘failing’ schools) as ‘workshy’ and as ‘benefits scroungers’ – an image which successive 
governments have not attempted to dispel. As such, legal instruments and political imperatives are 
heavily implicated in the concentration of crime (and hence victimisation risk) and the magnification of 
inequalities in England and Wales in the 25 or 30 years since the introduction of the right to buy.  
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TABLES 
Table 1: Summarising the Key Legislative Changes in Housing (1977-1989).  
Year Act title Provisions enacted 
1977 Homeless Persons Act Broadened the definition of homelessness and required LAs to home 
those with greatest social needs  
1980 Housing Act Right to buy introduced (33-50% discounts) 
1980 Local Govt Planning and Land Act Local Government Finance Competitive Tendering introduced 
1982 Soc. Sec. and Housing Benefit Act Housing Benefit introduced 
1984 Housing and Building Control Act Increased discounts for right to buy 
1984 Housing Defects Act Assistance to purchasers of defective LA houses  
1985 Housing Act Consolidation of existing legislation 
1985 Housing Associations Act Consolidation of existing legislation 
1986 Building Societies Act Liberalisation of mortgages 
1986 Housing and Planning Act Increased discounts for right to buy 
1986 Social Security Act Changes to Housing Benefit 
1988 Housing Act Increased discounts for right to buy; deregulated private housing 
1989 Local Govt and Housing Act Prevented Las from using rates to subsidise rents 
 
Table 2: Change in Housing Tenure 1982-1998 (BCS and BSAS, selected years) 
* 1983 for BSAS, ** 1989 for BSAS, *** 1993 for BSAS.  All figures are %s and weighted (BSC for 
households, BSAS for individuals). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1982* 1984 1988** 1992*** 1994 1996 1998 
BCS owners 61 64 66 68 69 70 67 
BCS social renters 30 27 28 22 23 21 20 
BSAS owners 66 66 71 69 71 70 72 
BSAS social renters 27 26 23 20 20 20 19 
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Table 3: Measures of Residualisation I: Demographic Data, 1982-1998 (BSC and BSAS, selected years) 
 1982* 1984 1988** 1992*** 1994 1996^ 1998 
Unemployment        
BCS owners 3 3 3 4 4 2 2 
BCS social renters 7 9 10 11 10 7 6 
Low income        
BCS owners - 28 19 12 11 10 7 
BCS social renters - 75 66 56 47 50 40 
BSAS owners 40 41 34 40 39 42 33 
BSAS social renters 70 70 76 76 74 81 74 
Adjacent to rundown stock        
BCS owners - 2 1 2 1 - - 
BCS social renters - 8 9 10 8 - - 
Ethnic Minority        
BSAS owners 4 2 2 4 5 4 4 
BSAS social renters 6 <1 4 6 8 7 9 
High Turnover areas        
BCS owners 7 7 - - 6 6 7 
BCS social renters 9 9 - - 13 12 12 
* 1983 for BSAS, ** 1989 for BSAS, *** 1993, ^ 1995 for BSAS.  All figures are %s and weighted 
for individuals.  
 
Table 4: Measures of Residualisation II: Benefit Recipients, 1986-1991 (BSAS) 
 1986 1987 1989 1990 1991 
Incapacity Benefit      
Owners 40 38 32 27 32 
Social renters 67 70 61 64 68 
Single Parent Benefit      
Owners 2 2 2 2 3 
Social renters 6 6 8 11 9 
Housing Benefit      
Owners 11 9 7 6 4 
Social renters 37 41 32 44 44 
Unemployment Benefit      
Owners 19 20 15 13 14 
Social renters 21 21 17 15 16 
 All figures are percentages and weighted for individuals. 
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Table 5: Measures of Residualisation III: Unemployment, 1972-1994 (GHS, even years) 
 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 
Owners 2 1 2 2 3 4 4 4 3 3 5 4 
Social renters 3 2 5 5 6 11 11 11 8 8 11 11 
 All figures are percentages and unweighted. 
 
Table 6: Use of Burglar Alarms, 1982-1998 (BCS) 
 1982 1988 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 
Owners 5 11 17 17 26 30 31 
Social renters 4 3 6 3 8 12 12 
All figures are percentages and weighted for households. 
 
Table 7: Domestic Property Crimes by Owners/Mortgaged and Renters (GHS) 
 
   All figures are percentages and unweighted. 
 
Table 8: Number of Domestic Property Crimes by Owners/Mortgaged and Renters (GHS) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9: Domestic Property Crimes by Owners/Mortgaged and Social Renters (BCS) 
 
All figures are percentages and weighted for households. 
 
 
 
 1972 1973 1980 
Owners  2 2 2 
Renters 3 3 3 
 1972 1973 1980 
Owners (mean) .0219 .02 .02 
Social renters (mean) .0395 .04 .04 
Mean difference .0175 .018 .018 
N 36718 36532 31443 
Sig (Mann-Whitney’s U) *** *** *** 
 1982 1984 1988 1992 1994 1996 1998 
Owners  8 8 9 9 11 10 9 
Social renters 11 10 11 13 12 12 11 
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Table 10: Number of Domestic Property Crimes by Owners/Mortgaged and Social Renters (BCS) 
 
 
 1982 1984 1988 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 
Owners (mean) .1298 .1385 .1383 .1387 .1724 .1483 .1473 .1198 
Social renters (mean) .2190 .1909 .2421 .2421 .3180 .3412 .3144 .2884 
Mean difference .0891 .0573 .1037 .1034 .1455 .1928 .1670 .1685 
N 9871 9888 11007 10770 15171 14915 13138 17191 
Sig (Mann-Whitney’s U) *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
